We describe a quantum key-distribution scheme in which two nearly orthogonal coherent states carry the key, and the superposition of these states (cat states) protects the communication channel from eavesdropping. Any eavesdropping activity can be detected from the disappearance of the interferential fringes in the distribution of the outcome when a certain quadrature component is measured through homodyne detection. This scheme is secure against conclusive-measurement attack and generalized beamsplitter attack, both believed to be a potential risk when multi-photon states are used as a quantum signal. 23.23.+x, 56.65.Dy 
I. INTRODUCTION
commuting observables, the measurement of one observable made on the eigenstate of another observable inevitably introduces disturbance to the state because of the back reaction of the measurement. Since Eve has no a priori information about the randomly chosen bases of each bit in the sifted key, she is forced to guess which observable to measure for each photon. On average, half the time Eve will guess wrong and thus introduce a disturbance into the state. The disturbance can be detected as a bit error by comparing parts of the sifted key.
The theoretical QKD schemes that have been proven secure against a wide class of attacks have involved the transmission of a single quantum particle that is subject to quantum mechanical complementarity. On the other hand, there has been growing interest among researchers on quantum information processing using multi-photon states [11, 12] . Several authors have extended this idea and have recently proposed a QKD scheme that uses multiphoton states as a quantum carrier [13] [14] [15] . All these authors used squeezed states, in which the key data are encoded on continuous, conjugate observables of the field quadrature components. Hillery further suggested that any nonlocal field state is useful for quantum information processing and communication [14] . In this paper, we provide another example that supports this suggestion by showing that the secure BB84 protocol can be constructed by using two nearly orthogonal coherent states and the superposition of these states (cat states).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II reviews the BB84 protocol. The connection between the protocol and the information exclusion principle proposed by Hall [16] is discussed and a comprehensive explanation of the principle of the BB84 protocol is given. Section III is devoted to the main subject of this paper. The basic idea and the protocol of the QKD scheme using two coherent states and their superposed state are presented, and the principle and security of this scheme are discussed. In Sec. IV, we summarize the main results of the paper.
II. BB84 PROTOCOL
The BB84 protocol can most clearly be understood in terms of the information exclusion principle [16] . The information exclusion principle provides an information-theoretic description of quantum complementarity and imposes an upper bound on the sum of the information gain obtained from observation of complementary observables in a quantum ensemble.
Consider two observables A and B of a quantum system with an N-dimensional Hilbert space. They are said to be complementary if their eigenvalues are nondegenerate, and the overlap of any two normalized eigenvectors |a j of A and |b j of B satisfy | a i |b j | = 1/ √ N; therefore, the eigenstates of A are equally weighted superpositions of the eigenstates of B, and vice versa. Thus, when the system is in an eigenstate of A, all possible outcomes of a measurement of B are equally probable; i.e., precise knowledge of the measured value of one observable implies maximal uncertainty of the measured value of the other. In such a case, an operator B is the generator of shifts in the eigenvalue of any eigenstate of A;
exp(iBl) |a j = a (j+l) mod N , and vice versa, exp(iAm) |b j = b (j−m) mod N [17] . Let ρ be a state of an given ensemble which is prepared with a priori probability p i in the known state ρ i , so ρ = i p i ρ i . The initial entropy of the system is H int = H(ρ) = − i p i log 2 p i (in bits). Given the conditional probability P (a j |ρ i ) = tr(ρ i A j ) for obtaining outcome a j when measuring an observable A when the state is prepared in ρ i , where
we can compute the a posteriori probability Q(ρ i |a j ) for preparation ρ i by Bayes's theorem as Q(ρ i |a j ) = P (a j |ρ i )p i /q j , where q j = i P (a j |ρ i )p i is the a priori probability for the occurence of outcome a j . After the measurement, the average entropy (in bits) becomes [18, 19] . Hall proved that the inequality
holds for Shannon mutual information for the measurement of complementary observables A and B on a system in arbitrary state ρ, where ξ = max | a j |b j | = 1/ √ N [16] . When N = 2, inequality (2.1) means that the recoverable information can never exceed the maximal von Neumann entropy (S max = 1) bit of the system, which depends only on the dimension -the number of distinguishable pure states -of the Hilbert space in which the signal states lie.
Inequality (2.1) states that the information gain corresponding to the measurement of an observable can be maximized only at the expense of the information gains corresponding to the measurement of the complementary observable. Hall named inequality (2.1) the information exclusion principle and showed that it is closely related to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and Bohr's complementary principle [16] .
To see how the information exclusion principle relates to the BB84 protocol, let us briefly review the optimal eavesdropping strategy within an individual-attack scheme in which each signal carrier sent by Alice is independently subject to eavesdropping. In this strategy, Eve lets a probe of arbitrary dimensions interact with each signal carrier independently. As a result, each of her probes is correlated to a transmitted state and its partial information is imprinted onto the probe. She then delays her measurement and keeps the quantum information in her probes until she learns the bases used by Alice and Bob from their public announcement. She finally tries to extract as much information as possible about the transmitted states by measuring her probes. To avoid revealing herself in too straightforward a manner by introducing different error rates in the different bases (because the error rate should be independent of the basis if the errors are due to a random process), Eve applies a symmetric eavesdropping strategy that treats the two bases on an equal footing. This strategy has been shown to require a two-qubit probe -i.e., a quantum system with a four-dimensional Hilbert space -and to be optimal by Fuchs [20] . He proved that the joint unitary operation U acting on the Hilbert space of the carrier and probe is a state-dependent optimal quantum-cloning process [21] [22] [23] that is given by Let us calculate the probabilities that Bob and Eve will correctly infer the state transmitted by Alice when Eve uses this eavesdropping strategy. These probabilities are characterized by the conditional probability P (j|i) of obtaining outcome j, given that state ρ i was transmitted by Alice. Suppose that Alice transmits either
Bob's marginal density matrices ρ 
where σ [25] [26] [27] of the map. When Bob performs a standard measurement on the sifted key, the conditional probabilities of Bob's inference of his signal j when Alice sends signal i are, for x = +, × and i, j = 0, 1,
On the other hand, Eve's strategy is first to distinguish between two mutually orthogonal sets S i = {σ smallest possible error probability. This is the best she can do in terms of the information gained from the sifted key [24] . It is well known that such a measurement is realized by standard measurement in the basis in the Hilbert space spanned by ψ x 00 and ψ x 11 or by ψ x 01 and ψ x 10 that straddles these vectors [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . This measurement gives the conditional probabilities of Eve's inference of her signal j when Alice sends signal i as and ρ E 1x . (Eve also knows when Bob has received an error) [20, [32] [33] [34] [35] . Finally, upon assuming equal a priori probabilities p 0+ = p 1+ = p 0× = p 1× , Bob's average probability (a posteriori probability) of correct (incorrect) inference of the state transmitted by Alice,
given by
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gives Bob's and Eve's fidelity, respectively, and
gives Bob's and Eve's error probability, respectively.
are convenient measures of Bob's and Eve's information gain [20] . Since these measures by the environment, they have to assume that all errors are due to a potential eavesdropper.
As long as Bob's error rate, Q B e , is small, the errors can be accepted and corrected by legitimate users. As a result, Eve can obtain some information about the transmitted data.
If the noise in the channel is such that I AB < I AE for any potential eavesdropper, then
Alice and Bob should consider the transmission channel to be unsafe. On the contrary, if I AB > I AE , they may still be able to extract a safe but much shorter cryptographic key by means of error correction and private amplification [6, 7] . Moreover, in a classical context there is, at least in principle, a way for Alice and Bob to exploit any positive difference, I AB − I AE , to create a reliably secret string of key bits that has a length of about I AB − I AE [36] [37] [38] . It is therefore important to estimate the maximal amount of information available to Bob and Eve for a given error rate Q B e that Bob can evaluate. With equiprobable signals, the average information gain is given by
, where
is the entropy function (in bits) and is a nonlinear function of q. The upper plot in Fig. 1 
and their information gains when Alice transmits the bits with the × basis are
) and I × AE = 0. Thus, this operation is clearly asymmetric with respect to the basis used in which Eve obtains information on the bits sent with one basis at the cost of a disturbance in the bits sent with the other basis. In this operation, Eve obtains information only about the observable P + (= |i + i + |) of the + basis on the system, while Bob obtains information about both P + and P × (= |i × i × |) of the × basis. Thus, when Bob observes P × , the above operation provides a method for simultaneously measuring complementary observables, P + and P × in which the outcome for Eve gives the information I AE = I(ρ; P + ) and that for Bob gives I AB = I(ρ; P × ).
When we extend this argument to the symmetric operation associated with an optimal eavesdropping strategy, we find I
) and I
because Bob's and Eve's information gains are independent of the basis Alice chose. We thus find that the symmetric operation provides a method for simultaneously measuring two complementary observables, P + and P × , even when Bob observes P + . In this case, the outcome for Eve gives the information I AE = I(ρ; P × ) and that for Bob gives I AB = I(ρ; P + ).
When we also take into account the fact that the sifted key involves only the data for which Alice's and Bob's bases agree, the above arguments imply that Bob's average information gain on the sifted key is given by
whereas Eve's information gain is given by
for the symmetric operation.
We can now see that the information exclusion principle leads to the inequality
Since the bases Alice and Bob used in the BB84 protocol are conju-
, and it follows from the information exclusion principle that the inequalities
should hold. Equations (2.11) and (2.12) and inequalities (2.13) and (2.14) imply that I AB +I AE ≤ 1. Since the optimal strategy is the best Eve can do, the inequality I AB +I AE ≤ 1 holds for any strategy Eve may try. We therefore conclude that the bound on the sum of Bob's and Eve's information I AB + I AE ≤ 1 is a direct consequence of the information exclusion principle.
It is helpful for later discussion to point out that the information exclusion principle is directly related to the fundamental equation between fringe visibility V and which-way information (path distinguishability) D opt in one-particle interferometry [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] . To demonstrate this point, we note that the identities
hold for a two-level system. We then find that Bob's marginal density matrices ρ 
These equations are isomorphic to the equations describing one-particle interferometry where V gives the fringe visibility and D opt = √ 1 − V 2 gives the maximal which-way information (path distinguishability), satisfying [39, 40] . Note that the initial states that Alice transmitted are given by setting V = 1 in these equations. This implies that the noise introduced by eavesdropping reduces the coherence (the off-diagonal terms)
of the initial states, and that Bob's bit error probability Q due to eavesdropping can also be detected by observing the fringe visibility V in some kinds of interferometry.
III. BB84 PROTOCOL USING TWO COHERENT STATES AND THEIR

SUPERPOSITION
The information exclusion principle ensures there is an upper bound on the eavesdropper's information gain and enables us to estimate this upper bound from that of the legitimate user. The requirement for this principle to be valid, on the other hand, does not mean that a single-photon state must be used as a signal carrier, but that the conjugate bases must belong to the same Hilbert space. In other words, we must choose the conjugate observables that operate within the same signal-state space. This requirement is satisfied when the polarization space of a single photon is used to encode information. For this purpose, we require a single-photon source, which has not yet been realized. To overcome this difficulty, a self-checking source, the validity of which can be self-checked, has been devised by Mayers et al. [45, 46] Alternatively, many experimental implementations of BB84 have used weak coherent pulses (WCP), rather than single photons; in these implementations, four equiprobable states given by , and thus do not satisfy the above requirement [53] . As a result, this implementation is vulnerable to eavesdropping. When α is large, these states are four non-orthogonal states lying in a four-dimensional signal state space instead of two sets of two orthogonal states lying in the two-dimensional signal state space used in the original singlephoton implementation. There are eavesdropping strategies that make use of the linear independence of the four states. Figure 2 illustrates the relevant subspace of the four states in the entire Hilbert space (the Fock space). Because of the linear independence of the states, there are non-overlapping subspaces in the four states. The states lying in this subspace can be perfectly distinguished from each other, and a skillful eavesdropper can make use of this flaw to obtain information about the key without detection [13] [14] [15] 53] . For example, Reid has described a strategy that makes use of this flaw, called the conclusive-measurement attack, in which Eve can sometimes get full information by using an appropriate "positive operator-valued measure" (POVM) [18, 27, 32] that conclusively distinguishes such linearly independent states [15] . Such measurement yields no information about the state most of the time, but it sometimes identifies the state unambiguously. This is fatal in the presence of high channel losses between Alice and Bob because Eve can recreate the state near Bob and send it to him without loss by substituting a lossless channel whenever she is able to measure the signal state unambiguously (otherwise she forwards nothing to Bob).
Another strategy, called the generalized beamsplitter attack, that makes use of this flaw has been reported on by several authors [13, 47, 48, 54] . Since the polarization and photon number are independent observables, there is no problem in principle in selecting a few pulses with two or more photons and separating them into two one-photon pulses without changing the polarization, for example, by means of quantum nondemolition measurement [56] . If the loss in the channel between Alice and Bob is large enough, Eve can resend the remaining photons to Bob without reducing the bit rate by substituting the lossless channel and suppressing the signal without causing errors. As a result, Eve can obtain information about the key seemingly without introducing errors in the transmission. Thus, a high transmission loss together with the multi-photon components of the signal states render the key distribution in all key-distribution schemes vulnerable, unless a strong reference pulse is used to protect against eavesdroppers who can suppress a signal without causing errors by sending a vacuum state to Bob [5] . This vulnerablity arises because that the states |i Nevertheless, the multi-photon state can be used to implement the BB84 protocol without this vulnerability. The basic idea of this scheme is depicted in Fig. 3 . Two nearly orthogonal coherent states |α and |−α are used to carry the key and the superposition of these states (|α ± |−α )/ 2(1 ± κ) is used to prevent from eavesdropping, where κ is the overlap of the two coherent states |α and |−α ; i.e., κ = | 0
2 . These states are the "Schrödinger's cat states" and are parity eigenstates that lie within the relevant two-dimensional signal subspace spanned by {|α , |−α } in the Fock state [55, 57, 58] . These four states would therefore behave much like ideal BB84 states.
In the following, we describe the protocol and explain how eavesdropping is detected.
Consider the following protocol. 6. After transmission, Alice publicly announces the positions of the first and second data subsets. Alice and Bob then discard the part of the first subset of data for which Bob measuredp a (θ = π/2) and the part of the second subset of data for which he measured
x a (θ = 0 ). Bob can obtain the sifted key from the first subset of the remaining data.
In terms of the sifted key, the conditional probability distributions p i+ (x a ) of Bob's output x when Alice transmits signal i obey the Gaussian distributions:
2)
where α = √ 2 |α|. The standard strategy for Bob to correctly infer the state transmitted by Alice is to set the decision threshold at x a = 0; i.e., he sets the bit value to 0 when he obtains x a ≥ 0 and to 1 when he obtains x a < 0. Then, his average error probability has finite value Q B e (α) =
. This is because the two coherent states |α and |−α are not orthogonal. Bob also checks the second subset of remaining data to detect possible eavesdropping. Provided that Alice transmits the |1 × state for the second subset, the associated conditional probability distribution p 1× (p a ) is
Therefore, when Bob builds up the probability distribution p 1× (p a ) of getting outcome p a upon measurement ofp a , the distribution should have interference fringes with a period of π/ α in the absence of eavesdropping [55, 60] .
To eavesdrop, Eve can, in principle, use a symmetric strategy by applying a joint unitary operation similar to the one shown in Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3). It involves complex multi-photon interaction between the single-mode field of the signal states and the probe system, and a physical mechanism that would enable such an operation has been unknown. Even if such an operation is realized, we can safely conclude that our proposed scheme is as secure as the single-photon case as far as this strategy is concerned by an argument similar to the singlephoton case. This conclusion is closely related to the fact that the quantum mechanical superposition of macroscopically distinguishable states is cannot be noninvasively measured [61, 62] , which is essentially a direct consequence of the quantum mechanical complementarity. Moreover, this scheme is secure against a conclusive-measurement attack because the two mutually conjugate sets |i + and |i × are linearly dependent. In the rest of the paper, we thus consider only a strategy that can only be used for cryptographic schemes using multi-photon states, that is, a beamsplitter attack. We show that, unlike the WCP implementation, the intentional eavesdropping activity will be detected by the legitimate users, and explain how the eavesdropping is detected.
We consider the following scenario. Eve uses a beam splitter (BS) to sample part of the signal. She sends Bob the part of the signal transmitted through the BS and measures the reflected part to gain information about the signal. What we want to know is how much she can learn and how much she disturbs the signal state. For this purpose, it is sufficient to calculate Eve's error rate Q E e for this particular scheme. If we denote the signal mode defined by the quantum channel as a and an auxiliary mode introduced at the BS as b, the associated joint unitary operation of the BS on coherent state input is
where T = √ 1 − R 2 is the transmission coefficient of the BS [63] . On the other hand, the same unitary operation transforms the |1 × state as 6) which represents the entangled states of modes a and b even though the BS is a linear device. Therefore, noise is inevitably introduced into the transmission of the |1 × state.
The associated marginal density matrices, ρ 
where
2 ,
2 (note that V B V E = κ), and the upper sign (resp. lower sign) corrsponds to i = 1 (resp. i = 0 
Such an optimum decision strategy is, in principle, realizable [64] [65] [66] .
What Alice and Bob want to do is to evaluate Q E e or Eve's average information gain 
The fringe visibility is therefore given by V B . Figure 4 shows Eve's average information This QKD scheme has advantages over the conventional schemes that use a single photon or a weak coherent pulse. First, in comparison with single-photon scheme, this scheme involves only quadrature phase measurements, which can be done more efficiently than photon counting. Second, in comparison with the WCP scheme, this scheme can use a more intense pulse, which can improve the transmission efficiency. However, the cat state is so fragile that the loss of the single photon may easily destroy the interference fringe observed in the probability distribution p 1× (p a ). Moreover, the decoherence rate of the cat state is proportional to the distance between the two distinguishable coherent states; i.e., it is proportional to √ 1 − κ 2 ∼ |α| [55, 60] . we think a cat state with an average photon number of the order of unity is appropriate for our scheme. In this sense, what is needed is not a "macroscopic" quantum superposition but a "mesoscopic" quantum superposition which should be easier to create.
In terms of current feasibility, our scheme is limited by its susceptibility to channel loss, which is a problem because it also destroys the fringes in the distribution p 1× (p a ). In contrast, the channel loss is simply discarded in the WCP scheme, but this discarding also makes the WCP scheme vulnerabe because an eavesdropper can use it while substituting a superior channel to escape detection. It is this extreme sensitivity of the nonclassical field state (like the cat state) to the environment, though, that enables us to detect eavesdropping. The current feasibility of our scheme is also limited by the difficulty of preparing the cat state with today's technology. However, a development of a quantum gate will help us to obtain the cat state through a swapping operation [67] between a coherent state and a more easily created superposition state of a single quanta [57, 68] .
IV. CONCLUSION
We have developped a quantum key-distribution scheme that uses two nearly orthogonal coherent states to carry the key, and the superposition of these states to protect the communication channel from eavesdropping. This scheme is secure against conclusive-measurement attack and beamsplitter attack even in the presence of loss; these types of attack are believed to be a potential risk when a multi-photon state is used as a quantum carrier. We expect this scheme to be as secure as the single-photon scheme and secure against any optimal eavesdropping strategy. The disappearance of interference fringes in the homodyne detection used to decode the key clearly indicates eavesdropping activity, and the amount of information leaked to an eavesdropper can be estimated from the visibility of the interference 
